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INTRODUCTION
THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning. Counsel, do we
want to move to the evidentiary matters first?
DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I object. I object. For the record, I
am Willie Edward Mitchell, Third, in a special visitation, under
threats, duress, and coercion, not general, not pro se. This
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for a lack of verified
complaint and lack of verified complaint sworn under oath.
This Court by its own motion can dismiss the alleged charge
and the alleged case against Willie Edward Mitchell, Third,
live flesh and blood man.1
So began Willie Mitchell’s articulation of his defense to racketeering and murder charges in federal court in Baltimore in 2005.2
Judge Andre Davis, ruling on various pro se motions in the case,
reflected that the nonsensical claims Mr. Mitchell and his codefendants raised “would even be humorous—were the stakes not so
high.”3 After summarily rejecting the defendants’ arguments as
“patently without merit,”4 Judge Davis explored the origins of their
“in-court tirades and irrational written objections based on ‘jurisdiction.’”5 Tracing these misguided arguments back through American

1. Transcript of Motions Hearing on Nov. 16, 2005 at 2, United States v. Mitchell, 405
F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. Md. 2005) (No. 1:04-cr-00029-AMD), ECF No. 393 [hereinafter Mitchell
Nov. 16, 2005 Transcript].
2. Id. This speech was followed by Mitchell’s three codefendants’ nearly identical
speeches. Id. at 3, 5, 10-11. The defendants maintained their objections throughout the
hearing: “A DEFENDANT: I’m not a defendant. I’m a live flesh and blood man,” id. at 12,
“A DEFENDANT: I do not consent or understand any of this court’s proceedings,” id. at 12.
3. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 604, aff’d Nos. 09-4215, 09-4357, 09-4359, 09-4361, 2011
WL 2356887 (4th Cir. June 15, 2011). The four Mitchell codefendants were variously charged
with racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering for five different murders, and
assorted drug and weapons offenses, and for most of the first four years of the life of their
federal case, they faced the death penalty. Gail Gibson, Four Men Named in Federal Charges:
Murder, Racketeering Case Could Bring Death Penalty; Rahman Associate Among Victims,
BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 2004, at 1B; see also Kevin Carey, Too Weird for The Wire: How Black
Baltimore Drug Dealers Are Using White Supremacist Legal Theories to Confound the Feds,
WASH. MONTHLY, May/June/July 2008, at 24, 27, 31.
4. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
5. Id. at 605.
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history revealed connections to a colorful cast of “religious zealots,
gun nuts, tax protestors, and violent separatists ... who believe that
America was irrevocably broken when the 14th Amendment
provided equal rights to former slaves.”6 Judge Davis found it “truly
ironic that four African-American defendants here apparently rely
on an ideology derived from a famously discredited notion: the
illegitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment.”7
This phenomenon, known colloquially in some jurisdictions as the
“flesh and blood defense,”8 is the embodiment in federal criminal
cases of a movement sometimes referred to as the “sovereign citizen”
or “anti-government” movement.9 Commentators trace this movement back to the “Posse Comitatus,” a loosely organized group of
right-wing extremists most active in the 1970s and ‘80s.10 Only pro
se defendants advance this “defense” because no competent attorney
would attempt to defend a criminal prosecution on such grounds.11
Indeed, the f lesh and blood defense is legally frivolous—“in a court’s
eyes, it is as if the proponent had advanced no argument at all.”12
The f lesh and blood defense is made possible by the Supreme
6. Carey, supra note 3, at 25.
7. Mitchell, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 606. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
8. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 3, at 25.
9. Id. at 28-29; see also THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT GUIDEBOOK, at vii (Nat’l Ctr.
for State Courts ed., 1999) [hereinafter NCSC GUIDEBOOK].
10. Carey, supra note 3, at 28; see also Mark Pitcavage, Common Law and Uncommon
Courts: An Overview of the Common Law Court Movement, in NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note
9, at 1, 3; Francis X. Sullivan, Comment, The “Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”:
The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785, 786-87.
11. See, e.g., Transcript of Motions Hearing on Dec. 8, 2005 at 18, Mitchell, 405 F. Supp.
2d 602 (No. 1:04-cr-00029-AMD), ECF No. 711 [hereinafter Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript]
(“[Counsel for Mr. Mitchell:] I don’t want to be associated with this train wreck that’s about
to occur in Mr. Mitchell’s life because this is positively the wors[t] decision that this young
man has ever made.”); Adam Harris Kurland, Court’s in Session: A Law Professor Returns to
the Majestic Chaos of a Criminal Jury Trial, 52 HOW. L.J. 357, 359 n.7 (2009) (describing,
from the point of view of one of the Mitchell codefendants’ attorneys, the “unusual tactics of
the defendants and their protestations concerning federal jurisdiction”).
12. John B. Snyder, Barbarians at the Gate?: The Law of Frivolity as Illuminated by Pro
Se Tax Protest Cases, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1249, 1265-66 (2008). Courts employ standards meant
to keep frivolous arguments out of court. See id. at 1254-60; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c).
Additionally, advancing a legally frivolous argument violates the ethics of the legal profession.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010).
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Court’s recognition of a fundamental right to self-representation in
criminal trials in Faretta v. California.13 The Court, even in first
recognizing this right, however, acknowledged the danger inherent
in self-representation—namely that pro se defendants may work
“ultimately to [their] own detriment.”14 There is no doubt that defendants who invoke the f lesh and blood defense are indeed working
to their own detriment.15
Although the Faretta Court declared that “[p]ersonal liberties are
not rooted in the law of averages,”16 the f lesh and blood defense has
no average success rate—as a legally frivolous argument it “simply
ignores the law as it currently exists”17 and fails every time.
Accordingly, this Note suggests that when defendants advance the
f lesh and blood defense, they should be denied their right to selfrepresentation in order to forestall them from using Faretta to
ensure their own conviction. Part I examines the evolution of the
f lesh and blood defense itself—from its use by midwestern white
supremacist farmers in the 1970s to black Baltimore drug dealers
in the 2000s—and its modern theory and practice. Part II discusses
the right to self-representation: its history, requirements, exceptions, and alternatives. Finally, Part III argues that when confronted with the f lesh and blood defense or similar nonsensical legal
theories, courts should refuse to respect a defendant’s waiver of
counsel. This policy would serve the interests of the defendant and
of society by allowing the adversarial system of justice to work as
intended, even if the defendant is allowed, at an appropriate time,
to make whatever bizarre claims he or she would like. A refusal to
allow a f lesh and blood defendant to fire his or her counsel can be
grounded in the existing law of self-representation and ensures that
13. 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).
14. Id. at 834.
15. See Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“Although unique by conventional legal
standards, the defendants[’] arguments are not new. Increasingly, they have been asserted
in criminal cases pending in this district, and have been summarily rejected. Similar
challenges have been advanced in other districts as well, but the results have been the
same.”).
16. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
17. Snyder, supra note 12, at 1266 (“A frivolous argument ... relies either on some
alternative regime which has never been recognized by the courts or on precepts taken from
outside the legal system.... Frivolous arguments are interlopers in the judicial system, foreign
entities that have meandered into the system from other parts of society.”).
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such defendants will not suffer from their decision to bring “the
intellectual legacy of white supremacists”18 into the courtroom.
I. THE FLESH AND BLOOD DEFENSE
A. History
1. The Posse Comitatus
At the peak of its popularity among midwestern and Great Plains
farmers in the 1970s and ‘80s, adherents to the Posse Comitatus
movement held that the Founding Fathers intended to create a
“Christian Republic” of individually sovereign citizens.19 In a
democracy, they believed, the poor could vote to create social welfare
programs, whereas in a republic, “the individual [is] sovereign and
the government ha[s] no power to enact laws that will loot and
plunder the wealth produced by the sovereign individual.”20 The
loosely organized group encouraged members to return identification cards and other government-issued documents in an effort to
“reclaim their sovereignty.”21 In one of its more bizarre holdings, the
Posse believed that Social Security numbers represented “secret
government account[s]” through which the American populace was
put up as collateral against the national debt.22 Further, they
asserted that one’s name on the Social Security card and secret
government account, spelled in all capital letters, represented a
fictional legal construct, not “them—natural, live, f lesh and blood
men.”23
Members of the Posse and similar offshoot movements used the
courts in an attempt to further their agenda. For example, one
former Colorado dairy farmer sold indebted farmers a “kit” that
Carey, supra note 3, at 25.
JAMES CORCORAN, BITTER HARVEST 26 (1990).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 27; see also DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST MOVEMENTS
TO THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 352 (1988); JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE:
THE KU KLUX KLAN, ARYAN NATIONS, NAZI SKIN, AND THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE CULTURE 129
(1997); Carey, supra note 3, at 28.
22. Carey, supra note 3, at 28.
23. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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assisted them in filing pro se lawsuits demanding millions of dollars
from their mortgage banks and the Federal Reserve.24 Not surprisingly, courts uniformly dismissed these suits as frivolous.25 Posse
members also recorded baseless liens against property owned by
government officials—liens that were costly to clear and that may
have remained undiscovered until the victim of the scam attempted
to sell the property.26 This bothersome tactic was also dead on
arrival in the courts.27 These activities stemmed from frustration
and desperation with a slumping agricultural economy, inspiring
Posse members to resort to “extralegal procedures that challenged
the legitimacy of established systems of justice.”28
The Posse’s activities were also defined by racial and religious
supremacism, which fueled the Posse’s views on law and government. For instance, “Christian Identity” was a “quasi-religious
movement,” or “theology,” that preached the “Christian Republic”
doctrine to Posse members, asserting that law in the United States
was based in “Christian Common Law” rather than law created by
legislatures.29 Christian Identity “contended that the Constitution
expressly forbids citizenship to Jews and people of color,” and
accordingly racial and religious minorities, as well as women, had
“no legal standing in a Posse government.”30
Its name meaning “[p]ower of the [c]ounty” in Latin, the Posse
Comitatus looked to ancient English common law to support its convictions that there were no legitimate forms of government higher
than the county, no legitimate law enforcement authorities higher
than the sheriff, and no legitimate judicial authorities higher than

24. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 32-33 (internal quotation marks omitted); Sullivan,
supra note 10, at 788.
25. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 33; see also Snyder, supra note 12, at 1264-67 (defining
legal frivolity).
26. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 33-34; Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 13-14, 18-19, 24-25;
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 788.
27. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 34.
28. Id.
29. BENNETT, supra note 21, at 350; CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 38-39.
30. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 27, 39; see also BENNETT, supra note 21, at 353-54. The
key tenets of the Identity belief were that the United States is the promised land, white
Christians are actually God’s chosen people—the “true ‘Israelites’ of the Old Testament”—and
nonwhite races are subhuman, mistakes created before Adam and Eve. CORCORAN, supra note
19, at 38-39; see also BENNETT, supra note 21, at 350; RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 53-54.
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the Justice of the Peace.31 The organization also derived inspiration
from the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which constrained the federal
government’s ability to use the military on domestic soil to protect
African-Americans, a move that ushered in the Jim Crow era.32
Although the organization did respect a strict construction of the
Constitution, believing it to be derived from God, Posse members
did not believe any amendments passed after the Bill of Rights were
legitimate because Jews and other minorities had ostensibly
corrupted the government.33
The Posse found many sympathetic ears across the country. A
1976 FBI report estimated the movement had 12,000 to 50,000
members encompassing seventy-eight chapters in twenty-three
states, as well as at least ten times as many casual supporters.34 As
the agricultural economy soured in the 1980s, the Posse was
increasingly successful in peddling its theories in middle America.35
Though many farmers were too skeptical or busy to listen, some,
who were desperate for hope in tough economic times, found
something tenable in the organization’s doctrines.36 New members
joined the Posse believing it would help them avoid legal and
financial responsibilities that they could not fulfill.37 The message
“was not one contingent upon a kind of backwater ignorance”;
31. BENNETT, supra note 21, at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted); CORCORAN, supra
note 19, at 27; RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 111-12; Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 4-5.
32. Carey, supra note 3, at 27-28; see Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, sec. 15, 20 Stat. 145,
152 (1878) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)).
33. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 27-28. The organization was particularly opposed to the
Sixteenth Amendment, the abandonment of the gold standard, the Federal Reserve system,
the United Nations, and the desegregation of public schools, among other public policies. Id.
at 28; RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 111-13.
34. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 29-30; RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 115, 117. For
examples of Posse Comitatus propaganda, see RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 111-12, 114-19,
125, 130, 133-34.
35. BENNETT, supra note 21, at 354-55; CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 39-40 (“[T]he
message they bore was filled with scapegoats, not solutions. It was anti-Semitic, racist, and
hateful. It was a message that was as ludicrous as it was simple, and one sired by
desperation.”).
36. BENNETT, supra note 21, at 354; CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 40 (“Sure the message
was crazy. Sure it didn’t make sense. But was it any crazier, or did it make any less sense,
than what was happening in the country? People on welfare ate well with the benefit of
farmers’ tax dollars while the farmers themselves groveled for food and were forced from their
homes.”); see Carey, supra note 3, at 28; Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 8.
37. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 5.
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rather, it was a frustrated reaction of people who felt they had “lost
control of their lives.”38 These feelings of desperation and fear are
what unite the Posse Comitatus with Willie Mitchell and the f lesh
and blood defendants.
2. From the Heartland to Baltimore
As the agricultural economic crisis of the 1980s corrected itself,
and as Posse Comitatus leaders died or were locked up, the movement sputtered.39 However, the beliefs advanced by the Posse remained deeply rooted in middle America, often under the banner of
the “patriot movement,” which included the bombers of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.40 After the
Oklahoma City bombing, federal law enforcement began paying
closer attention to the supremacist and separatist groups that echoed the bombers’ ideology, including the “Montana Freemen,” who
were “the direct ideological descendants of the Posse Comitatus.”41
After an eighty-one day standoff with the FBI at their compound
between March and May 1996, the FBI arrested the Freemen.42 The
prosecution that followed faced “an array of bizarre documents
citing the Fed[eral Reserve Bank], the gold standard, the 14th
Amendment, and the Uniform Commercial Code,” not unlike those
filed by Willie Mitchell a decade later.43 Despite their conviction and
imprisonment, those who sympathized with the Freemen continued
to distribute these materials, in part through the publication
“America’s Bulletin,” a newsletter circulated by prison inmates that
espoused an antigovernment, white supremacist philosophy.44
38. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. BENNETT,
supra note 21, at 354; RIDGEWAY, supra note 21, at 126-27.
39. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 4 (“As an organized right-wing group, the Posse did not
really survive. But the Posse had never been simply an organization—indeed, it was hardly
ever well organized. The Posse Comitatus was much more durable as an ideology. Thousands,
perhaps tens of thousands, of people who never formally belonged to any Posse group
nevertheless subscribed to Posse ideology. The belief system survived even as the group
faded.”); see id. at 19.
40. Id. at 2, 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Carey, supra note 3, at 29 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41. Carey, supra note 3, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.; Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 26.
43. Carey, supra note 3, at 29.
44. Id.
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Though the Freemen brought the ideas of the Posse Comitatus
back to national prominence, the small-time legal activities of the
Posse had never fully ceased.45 Along similar lines, the phenomenon
of “common law courts” spread during the 1990s, giving Posse
adherents a forum they viewed as legitimate for the adjudication of
claims against them.46 These courts sprang from the Posse’s assertion that common law was “a separate, parallel legal/judicial
system, one independent from and not subordinate to statutory or
written law.”47 Far from the legal conception of common law, the
Posse’s common law was “a hodgepodge of Biblical quotes and doctrines, misplaced quotes from cases, leftover concepts from early
legal doctrines, self-serving readings of the Constitution and other
sources of law, definitions from long out-of-date legal dictionaries,
and Blackstone’s conception of ‘natural rights.’”48 In some states the
common law courts were largely dormant, whereas in other states,
such as Texas and Florida, the faux courts were “a plague on the
judicial system.”49 In appearances in actual courts, adherents to the
movement unsuccessfully insisted on the strict use of their “common
law.”50
In federal court in Baltimore, according to one journalist’s
investigation, the missing link—“patient zero in the epidemic”—was
federal pretrial detainee Michael Burpee, whose time at the
Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center (MCAC) overlapped with
Willie Mitchell’s.51 When Burpee arrived at the MCAC in downtown
45. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing “strange filings” in courts, “confrontational
motorists pulled over for homemade license plates,” and “bogus liens” filed against attorneys’
property by their pro se opponents).
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 9. Courts were not the only parallel institutions the Posse invented. In utilizing
“common law banks,” for example, “the term ‘common law’ was attached to the word ‘bank’
as a (futile) attempt to avoid the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 60.
49. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 2. For instance, after a rash of civil and criminal
defendants attempted to “remove” their cases to a common law court, the Court of Appeals
of Texas declared “the Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas, if it ever existed, has
ceased to exist,” as of the date of Texas’s statehood. Kimmell v. Burnet Cnty. Appraisal Dist.,
835 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. App. 1992); see also, e.g., Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 23-24; Valerie
Richardson, ‘Courts of Common Law’ Punish with Phony Paper; ‘Patriot’ Movement Has
Fooled Many, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at A1.
50. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 39-41.
51. Carey, supra note 3, at 29.
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Baltimore, he arrived with “a pile of documents that were remarkably similar to those that had been filed by the Montana Freemen,”
presumably given to him by a fellow prisoner in Florida before
extradition to Maryland to face federal drug charges.52 Possibly
because he was already serving a twenty-seven-year sentence, the
United States Attorney’s Office in Baltimore dropped its charges
against Burpee, a choice that may have inadvertently legitimized
his year-long extolment of f lesh and blood claims in the eyes of his
fellow Maryland pre-trial detainees.53 What followed was a proliferation of f lesh and blood claims that one Baltimore Federal Public
Defender likened to “an infection that was invading our client
population of pre-trial detainees.”54 Like the midwestern farmers
before them, the Baltimore inmates “were susceptible to the notion
that the federal government was engaged in a massive, historic plot
to deprive them of life, liberty, and property”—a notion not unfamiliar to the African American community.55 Adherents to the doctrines
of the Posse Comitatus and f lesh and blood defendants alike felt
that they had lost control of their lives and were grasping for
anything to give them hope of restoring their freedom and personal
sovereignty.56

52. Id. Coincidentally, “[n]owhere more than in Florida” was the Posse Comitatus so
resurgent in the 1990s, where “[t]ax protesters, white supremacists, common law court
advocates and others combined to give new energy to Posse ideology.” Pitcavage, supra note
10, at 20. For an example of Mr. Burpee’s flesh and blood pleadings see, inter alia, Notice and
Demand to Dismiss for Lack of Any Criminal Jurisdiction Whatsoever at 11, United States
v. Burpee, No. 8:03-cr-00215-SCB-EAJ (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2005), ECF No. 232 (“Until and
unless the United States (federal government) can prove ownership over said geographical
land mass, particularly that parcel of land which is the private real property of the Defendant,
the USDC have no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever within any of the 50 Union states.”
(emphasis omitted)).
53. Carey, supra note 3, at 29-30.
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 30.
56. CORCORAN, supra note 19, at 41.
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B. Characteristics of the Defense
1. Theory
When Willie Mitchell and other f lesh and blood defendants recite
the refutations of federal authority likely to have been heard from
members of the Posse Comitatus in the 1970s, they “inherit[ ] the
intellectual legacy of white supremacists.”57 Like their predecessors,
they believe that they are “sovereign citizens,” not “federal citizens”
or “corporate citizens” under the Fourteenth Amendment—resulting
in the irony that Judge Davis described.58 They claim that American
citizenship granted by the Fourteenth Amendment is a ploy by
corporations to “financially enslave the masses and destroy the
republican union.”59 They theorize that this citizenship is grounded
in a contract between each citizen and the federal government—a
contract that may be canceled by renouncing citizenship.60
In the light of their absolute certainty of their God-given rights as
sovereign citizens and their equal conviction that the government
is engaged in a conspiracy to foil those rights, the contumacious
behavior of f lesh and blood defendants is more easily explained.61
Further, because these defendants believe in a common law fantasy,
their frequent choice to appear pro se is understandable. Lawyers
cannot advocate the legally frivolous f lesh and blood defense,62 an
inability that their prospective clients construe as only another
part of the conspiracy.63 “Most important of all, they continuously
challenge the court on questions of jurisdiction and claim that the
court has no authority over them”64—sometimes even on grounds as
57. Carey, supra note 3, at 25.
58. United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605-06 (D. Md. 2005); see NCSC
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 35; Carey, supra note 3, at 29; Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 11.
59. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 11-12 (“Simply stated, Americans can refuse to participate. Americans can
revoke their social security numbers, their license plates, their income tax. They can declare
themselves once more to be ‘sovereign citizens.’”); see also supra text accompanying notes 1923.
61. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 11.
62. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
63. Pitcavage, supra note 10, at 12 (“In court, sovereign citizens refuse to accept the aid
of lawyers ... and instead defend themselves, usually unsuccessfully.”).
64. Id.
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irrelevant as what kind of flag hangs in the courtroom65 or whether
their names appear in all capital letters in the indictment.66
2. Practice
The argument that f lesh and blood defendants present centers
on a lack of personal jurisdiction, as the defendant asserts he or
she is not a “corporate citizen” but a “live f lesh and blood man,” a
“sovereign citizen.”67 Thus, f lesh and blood defendants avoid making
any suggestion that the court’s jurisdiction is proper, which may
start with a protest as simple as refusing to identify themselves for
the record.68 Similarly, some defendants may refuse to acknowledge
that they are the person named in the indictment, often because the
indictment names the defendant in all capital letters, and f lesh
and blood theory instructs that the all-capital name represents the
“corporate citizen” named on one’s Social Security card.69 These
defendants may also refuse to sign documents or insist on appending their signatures with suffixes that symbolize their personal
sovereignty.70 Indeed, some defendants may refute that they are the
person named in the indictment because of the special suffixes they
add to their names.71 Beyond mere refusal to identify themselves,
f lesh and blood defendants may refuse to enter a plea, to be crossexamined by the government, or to participate in the proceedings at
all, wary of giving any indication that might imply the court has

65. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 32-34; see also, e.g., Richard McDonald, Have You
Been Hornswoggled? Which Flag Is Which?, in NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 98.
66. United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (D. Md. 2005).
67. See supra text accompanying note 58.
68. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 47.
69. See id.; supra text accompanying note 23.
70. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 63.
71. Id. at 47; see, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Case for Mistaken Identity & Jurisdictional
Issues over a Sovereign at 1, 4, United States v. Mosley, No. 4:07-cr-00204-SOW (W.D. Mo.
Nov. 6, 2007), ECF No. 27 (arguing lack of jurisdiction over the defendant indicted as
“MONARD D. MOSLEY” but who signed this motion as “Monard-Dwayne:Mosley-EL©
Secured Party, Sui Juris, one of the sovereign people, a private man on the land, non
combatant, an American by Birth, a child of the Living GOD(YHWH), Grantor, secired [sic]
party/creditor and principle of which ‘Rights’ existed long antecedent to the organization of
the State and Trustee”) [hereinafter Mosley Motion to Dismiss].
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power over them.72 Other defendants, such as Willie Mitchell, are
fond of filibustering the court, launching into soliloquies on common
law jurisdiction that are legal gibberish.73
Outside of the courtroom, f lesh and blood defendants may create
more of a nuisance for the court than they do inside it. By filing
“simply irrelevant or contextually inapposite” documents with the
court, whether in their criminal cases or in parallel pro se civil
actions, f lesh and blood defendants occupy a disproportionate
amount of judicial time and court resources.74 Employing their farfrom-legal conception of “common law,” these defendants appeal to
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Bible, self-serving readings of
out-of-context precedent, and other far-flung references to support
their motions for dismissal, disqualification of judges, and other
relief.75 It all amounts to little more than a “morass of useless
drivel.”76
Transcending legal attacks on jurisdiction, subscribers to f lesh
and blood theory may make the judge, or the court generally, the
target of both legal attacks and direct threats. For instance, by filing
a lawsuit against the judge hearing their criminal cases, defendants
may claim that the judge has a conflict of interest and cannot
continue hearing the criminal matter.77 Other defendants may
choose to skip lawsuits and attack the judge’s impartiality through

72. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 50; see, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555,
557 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, after identifying himself, the defendant refused to answer
the judge’s questions, stating, “I am a live and living, flesh and blood breathing man, who is
a secured party who is sovereign,” and “I am not a corporation”).
73. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 50; see, e.g., Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript,
supra note 11, at 36 (“[Counsel:] They don’t want to participate in any way with the
proceedings to give the proceedings any imprimatur or any sort of legitimacy.”); Mitchell Nov.
16, 2005 Transcript, supra note 1, at 2-6, 10-12.
74. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 60-62.
75. See supra text accompanying note 48.
76. See supra text accompanying note 48; see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, Nos. 054984, 05-4988, 2007 WL 805992, at *3-4 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (“Defendants’ motions were,
on their face, completely frivolous.... [F]or the district court to have conducted a formal
hearing [on the motions] would have been pointless.”); Mosley Motion to Dismiss, supra note
71, at 1-4; see also Affidavit of Mistaken Identity, Mosley, 607 F.3d 555 (No. 4:07-cr-00204SOW), ECF No. 28. Regarding Mr. Mosley’s filings, the Eighth Circuit quoted from the record
that “the magistrate judge was ‘hard pressed to decipher and discern’” their meaning. Mosley,
607 F.3d at 557.
77. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 57-58, 69.
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traditional means such as motions for recusal or disqualification.78
Others may focus simply on filing nuisance suits and property liens
against judges and court personnel.79 More worrisome than these
harassment tactics, however, are the defendants who make threats
of violence that may constitute crimes in and of themselves.80
Finally, and most critically, no lawyer would advance the legally
frivolous f lesh and blood defense, a reality that leads f lesh and
blood defendants to fire their attorneys and proceed pro se. Though
f lesh and blood defendants may make demands for counsel of their
choice, they insist on attorneys who will adopt their philosophy,
which is impossible,81 or nonlawyers, which the court will not
allow.82 Further, although indigent criminal defendants enjoy a
fundamental right to appointed counsel,83 they are not entitled to
counsel of their choice.84
One solution, of course, is for f lesh and blood defendants to accept
representation, allowing counsel to make appropriate legal arguments and reserving their jurisdictional theories as a sideshow.85
Whether a conscious choice or one made for them by a court refusing
to respect their waivers of counsel, this option serves the interests
of the defendants and of society by allowing the adversarial system
of justice to work as intended, while preserving the defendant’s
right to make, at an appropriate time, whatever bizarre claims he
or she would like. This Note argues that courts should follow this
option when confronted with spectacles such as the f lesh and blood
defense.

78. Id. at 57-58.
79. Id. at 69.
80. Id. at 54, 72; see, e.g., United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a defendant known to the clerk’s office “because of his voluminous pro se filings”
was sentenced to sixty months for mailing threats to the judge and his public defender in a
previous matter (emphasis omitted)).
81. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
82. NCSC GUIDEBOOK, supra note 9, at 52-53; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006).
83. See infra Part II.
84. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151-52 (“[T]he right to counsel of choice does not
extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” (citations omitted)).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 & n.6 (D. Md. 2005)
(indicating that the Mitchell defendants simply refused to cooperate with their counsel, not
that they were firing their counsel).
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II. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. History
1. Legal Tradition
In the early British legal tradition, self-representation was the
rule rather than the exception.86 Even as the institution of legal
counsel developed in civil and misdemeanor cases, felony cases
remained a “long argument between the prisoner and the counsel
for the Crown.”87 Far from a “right” of the accused, this traditional
self-representation scheme allowed defendants little more than the
ability to articulate a defense of their choosing.88 Not until the
passage of the Treason Act of 1695 were felony defendants accorded
a right to counsel,89 which jurists viewed as a right to choose between counsel and self-representation.90 In colonial America,
although courts broadly afforded criminal defendants the right to
counsel, judges maintained the understanding that the privilege
augmented the underlying right of defendants to represent themselves.91 Accordingly, colonial charters and declarations of rights
framed the entitlement to counsel as a “right to choose” whether to
represent oneself or to proceed with an attorney, an interpretation
grounded in the virtue of self-reliance as well as a healthy distrust
of lawyers.92
After the ratification of the Constitution, Congress codified the
right to self-representation in the Judiciary Act of 1789,93 which was
86. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821-32 (1975).
87. Id. at 823-24 (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 325-26 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883)).
88. Id. (quoting 5 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195-96
(1927)).
89. Id. at 824-26.
90. Id. at 825. During this period, however, counsel was never “forced upon the
defendant.” Id. at 825-26.
91. Id. at 829-30; see also id. at 830 n.39 (“The Founders believed that self-representation
was a basic right of a free people.”).
92. Id. at 826-30; see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 156-57 (2000).
93. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (“[I]n all the courts of the
United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the
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signed into law one day before the formal proposal of the Sixth
Amendment.94 This provision for self-representation in the federal
courts remains codified today in language substantially similar to
the 1789 provision.95 Most early state constitutions also provided a
right to self-representation,96 and most states continued to grant the
right either by constitutional provision or judicial decision into the
twentieth century.97
2. Faretta v. California
California, unlike most states, did not adopt a right to selfrepresentation in its constitution or jurisprudence.98 Accordingly,
when Anthony Pasquall Faretta appeared before a Los Angeles
Superior Court judge on a charge of grand theft in 1972, his attempt
to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied after
extended quizzing from the judge on courtroom procedure.99 Two
years later, the United States Supreme Court reversed Mr. Faretta’s
conviction, holding that “the California courts deprived him of his
constitutional right to conduct his own defense.”100 Elevating the
right to self-representation to the level of a fundamental constitutional right, Faretta precipitated decades of confusion and contro-

assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively
shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812
(“In the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the
beginnings of our Nation.”).
94. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 831; see also id. at 812-13.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead
and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”).
96. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 829 n.38; see, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVIII (providing that
the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law is “not intended to exclude any person
from that inherent privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause”).
97. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 813-14 & nn.9-11; see, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (“[E]very
subject shall have a right ... to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council, at his
election.”); State ex rel. Meekins v. Superintendent, Md. House of Corr., 99 A.2d 724, 725 (Md.
1953) (“A person charged with an offense may plead his own cause, without counsel if he
prefers.”).
98. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811-12 & nn.6, 8.
99. Respondent’s Brief at 8-11, Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 (No. 73-5772), 1974 WL 186114.
100. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added).
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versy in courts struggling to define the contours of this newfound
individual liberty.101
The Faretta Court found the right to self-representation in two
places: the structure of the Sixth Amendment and the legal tradition of self-representation.102 The Court looked to the three Sixth
Amendment rights that precede the right to counsel—the rights to
notice, confrontation, and compulsory process103—to determine that
the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to
make his defense.”104 Further, the Court observed, the right to
counsel is phrased as a right “to have the Assistance of Counsel.”105
The Court worried that compulsory counsel would not be an
“assistant” but a “master.”106 The Court also cited its own precedent
holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel implicitly embodies a ‘correlative right to dispense with a
lawyer’s help’” and that “the Constitution does not force a lawyer
upon a defendant.”107
Reviewing the entire legal landscape, the Court identified “a
nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our
courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do
101. John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 483, 488-89, 492 (1996). Among practitioners, the Faretta decision “does not have
a particularly wide fan base.” Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation:
An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 434 n.46 (2007).
102. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. Regarding the legal tradition discussed supra Part II.A.1, the
Court concluded that “the colonists and the Framers, as well as their English ancestors,
always conceived of the right to counsel as an ‘assistance’ for the accused, to be used at his
option, in defending himself.” Id. at 832.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor.”).
104. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
105. See id. at 818, 820-21 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
106. Id. at 820 (“To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus
violates the logic of the Amendment .... [T]he right to make a defense is stripped of the
personal character upon which the Amendment insists.”).
107. Id. at 814-15 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)); see also id. (“When the administration of the criminal law is hedged about as it is by
the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of
his free choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards is to imprison a man in his
privileges and call it the Constitution.” (quoting Adams, 371 U.S. at 279-80)).
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so.”108 Thus, the Court reasoned, the defense presented by counsel
forced on a defendant who wishes to represent him- or herself “is not
the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real
sense, it is not his defense.”109 This philosophy is what allowed
Willie Mitchell to advance his frivolous arguments, and although it
may have been “his defense,” a f lesh and blood defense is, ironically,
no defense at all.
B. Requirements
The rights to counsel and to self-representation are logically at
odds with one another. Defendants must choose which Sixth
Amendment right they want to exercise: the jealously guarded right
to competent counsel110 or the much-maligned right to self-representation.111 Courts must necessarily interpret the assertion of one of
these conflicting rights as a waiver of the other.112 Judges must
“traverse a thin line between improperly allowing the defendant to
proceed pro se, thereby violating his right to counsel, and improperly having the defendant proceed with counsel, thereby violating
his right to self-representation.”113
108. Id. at 817.
109. Id. at 821.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); see also, e.g., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (incorporating the right to counsel to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that “in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938)
(elevating the right to counsel to a jurisdictional bar for federal criminal jurisdiction, holding
that if a defendant “is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently
waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty” (emphasis added)).
111. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 101, at 489-90 (attacking Faretta as “undermin[ing] the
integrity and efficiency of the criminal justice system” and as “wrongly decided”).
112. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he right to selfrepresentation and the right to representation by counsel, while independent, are essentially
inverse aspects of the Sixth Amendment .... [T]he right to counsel and the right to selfrepresentation are mutually exclusive.” (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d
166, 174-77 (1st Cir. 1987))); see also id. at 1101 (“The Faretta Court clearly contemplated that
the right to self-representation cannot be exercised without first eliciting a valid waiver of the
right to counsel from the defendant.”).
113. Id. at 1096 (quoting Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc))
(alterations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Cross v. United States,
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To simplify the analysis, courts ascribe a “constitutional primacy”
to the right to counsel.114 This preference is justified by the benefits
that representation brings to both individual defendants and
society.115 When defendants have legal representation, they are
more likely to secure favorable outcomes, and trials are more likely
to result in correct verdicts based on the truths discerned by the
fact-finder.116 By ensuring that the judicial process is “fair and
legitimate,” representation by counsel “sustain[s] public confidence
in the system and in the rule of law,” which is an “important public
purpose.”117 On the other hand, Faretta makes clear that selfrepresentation is an individual right, anchored in the “dignity and
autonomy” of pro se defendants, not in sound public policy.118
The Faretta Court did not ignore the problems inherent in selfrepresentation. Recognizing that “[i]t is undeniable that in most
criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,”119 the Court articulated some limitation on the right but did not clearly define all of
the right’s boundaries. In cases interpreting Faretta, courts have
elucidated the scope of the right to self-representation by imposing
three common requirements on its invocation in order to safeguard against improper waivers of the right to counsel.120 First, the
defendant’s request to represent him- or herself must be “clear and
unequivocal”;121 second, the request must be “knowing, intelligent

893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Because self-representation necessarily entails the
waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel, a trial court can commit reversible
constitutional error by either improperly granting a request to proceed pro se—and thereby
depriving the individual of his right to counsel—or by denying a proper assertion of the right
to represent oneself, and thereby violating Faretta.”).
114. Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1102.
115. Id. at 1101-02.
116. Id. at 1102. But see Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 446-54 (providing empirical
evidence that pro se defendants generally are not as disadvantaged in court as is commonly
believed); see also id. at 441-46 (discussing limitations on this data).
117. Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1102.
118. Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)).
119. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-34 (1975). But see Hashimoto, supra note 101,
at 446-54.
120. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000).
121. Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th
Cir. 1985).
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and voluntary”;122 and third, the request must be “timely.”123 When
evaluating defendants’ requests to represent themselves against
these standards, courts err on the side of nonwaiver of the right to
counsel, both to protect its constitutional primacy and to avoid
leaving defendants defenseless.124
1. Clear and Unequivocal
Two purposes motivate the requirement that defendants “clearly
and unequivocally”125 waive their right to counsel: first, to protect
against inadvertent waivers gleaned from defendants’ “occasional
musings on the benefits of self-representation”; and second, to
protect against defendants taking advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation to create
reversible error.126 Because exercising the right to self-representation is a waiver of the constitutionally primary right to counsel,
courts “must be reasonably certain that [a defendant] in fact wishes
to represent himself.”127 This not only protects the defendant’s
rights, but it also protects the court from being accused on appeal of
depriving the defendant of the right to counsel if the court allows
the defendant to proceed pro se. Forcing the defendant to give a
clear and unequivocal waiver of counsel allows for the necessary
certainty, and if a defendant equivocates, the court may soundly
default to the constitutionally preferred right and appoint counsel.128
A clear and unequivocal waiver of counsel can be a difficult
decision for f lesh and blood defendants to make, as it was for Willie

122. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1993); Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1095-96.
123. United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979).
124. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 558-59; Singleton,
107 F.3d at 1102.
125. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; see also Decker, supra note 101, at 504-10.
126. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 558-59; see also United States v. Gonzalez, Nos. 05-4984, 054988, 2007 WL 805992, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007); Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287,
1290 (11th Cir. 1990); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989); Tuitt v. Fair, 822
F.2d 166, 174-77 (1st Cir. 1987).
127. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444; cf. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65. But see Cross, 893 F.2d at
1290 (“A trial court’s evaluation of an individual’s desire to represent himself is fraught with
the possibility of error.”).
128. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444.
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Mitchell and his codefendants.129 Flesh and blood defendants may
in fact demand counsel—counsel that will advocate their f lesh and
blood defense.130 Judges, however, may interpret such a request as
a waiver of counsel because no such counsel exists. In Mitchell,
Judge Davis determined that such a request was not a valid waiver
because “while claiming they want counsel, [they] have in effect
erected an absolute barrier to the appointment of counsel [and] I
don’t think the Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit will permit a
defendant to get away with that.”131 With the interests of Mitchell
and his codefendants in mind, Judge Davis erred on the side of
representation by counsel.132 Apparently, the defendants appreciated the court’s choice, because on appeal, none of the Mitchell defendants alleged a deprivation of the right to self-representation.133
2. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary
The requirement that defendants “knowingly and intelligently”134
waive their right to counsel comes with a requirement that judges
make defendants aware of the “dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation,” in order to establish on the record that such defendants are making their choice “with eyes open.”135 This requirement
129. See, e.g., Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 4 (“[Defendant Harris:]
As a matter of fact, I want counsel. Yet every attorney I have spoken with has a conflict of
interest because they have sworn an oath to support my adversary, the United States of
America and the United States District Court.”); see also id. at 7 (Defendant Gardner).
130. See supra text accompanying note 84.
131. Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 27.
132. Memorandum Opinion and Order of March 2, 2006 at 26-27, United States v. Mitchell,
405 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. Md. 2005) (No. 1:04-cr-00029-AMD), ECF No. 224 [hereinafter
Mitchell March 2, 2006 Order], available at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/
Opinions/gardner03022006.pdf.
133. See Consolidated Final Brief of Appellants at 2-4, United States v. Mitchell, No. 094215 (L) (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 2011), 2011 WL 38814 [hereinafter Mitchell Appellants Brief] (listing
issues on appeal).
134. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464-65 (1938)).
135. Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942));
see, e.g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A waiver of counsel
will be considered knowing and intelligent only if the defendant is made aware of (1) the
nature of the charges against him; (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.”); Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce the right to self-representation has been invoked initially, the trial court
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has given rise to the Faretta colloquies between district judges and
pro se defendants recommended by the Federal Judicial Center.136
Simply asking the questions in the colloquy fulfills the requirement.
The defendant’s answers are largely irrelevant because actual legal
knowledge is not necessary; only notice of what the defendant may
need to know to conduct the trial is needed.137 The court may,
however, evaluate whether the defendant’s waiver of counsel is
actually knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of “the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”138
Flesh and blood defendants may have trouble demonstrating a
knowing and intelligent waiver. Given their contumacious behavior,
it is unlikely that a f lesh and blood defendant could fully complete
the Faretta colloquy, as was the case in Mitchell.139 Judge Davis
observed: “I think clearly, that the Court will not be permitted by
the defendants each to engage in a waiver of counsel colloquy. That,
of course, has got to be the understatement of the day.”140 Judges
can interpret f lesh and blood defendants’ nonsensical reactions to
the Faretta colloquy as a knowing and intelligent waiver, or, as in
Mitchell, as an absolute nonwaiver of counsel.
3. Timely
Finally, defendants must assert their right to represent themselves in a timely fashion in order to “minimize disruptions, to avoid
inconvenience and delay, to maintain continuity, and to avoid
confusing the jury.”141 Even fundamental rights are not intended to
serve “as a ploy to frustrate the orderly procedures of a court in the
must conduct a hearing or engage the defendant in a colloquy to ensure that the defendant’s
decision is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently [and] to reduce the likelihood of
constitutional error by eliciting from the defendant and explicitly establishing for the record
his awareness of his constitutional rights, his decision to waive the right to counsel, his
awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se, and his unambiguous decision to proceed without
counsel.”); see also Decker, supra note 101, at 500-04, 510-17.
136. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 6-7 (5th ed.
2007). The model Faretta colloquy appears in the Appendix.
137. See id.
138. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
139. Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 11-12.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1102 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also Decker, supra note 101, at 544-50.
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administration of justice.”142 When to draw the line after which a
defendant’s choice is final, however, is a debatable point.143 Requests
to represent oneself or for appointment of counsel are generally
measured against whether “meaningful trial proceedings have
commenced.”144 After that point, whether to grant a request to proceed with or without counsel is at the discretion of the court.145
C. Exceptions
Because of its disfavor as a strictly individual privilege, courts
have not hesitated to carve out exceptions to the right to selfrepresentation when they identify broader concerns that outweigh
the rights of a particular defendant. For example, the Supreme
Court has excluded criminal appeals from the scope of Faretta, confining the right solely to self-representation at trial.146 As another
exception to the right to self-defense, the Supreme Court recently
held that a heightened standard of mental competence could be
imposed on waivers of the right to counsel,147 overturning years of
precedent that suggested the competence needed to proceed pro se

142. United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979).
143. See id. at 1324-25 & n.2.
144. Id. at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See id.
146. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000). Faretta is silent on
appeals, but the Supreme Court in Martinez went further, reanalyzing each point of Faretta’s
reasoning to determine that self-representation is unavailable on appeal. Id. at 159-63.
Specifically, starting with the premise that there is no constitutional or historical right of
appeal at all, the Court noted three things: (1) the Sixth Amendment does not provide a right
to appellate counsel, foreclosing the possibility of a correlative right to a pro se appeal; (2) the
legal history and tradition discussed in Faretta did not support a right to a pro se appeal; and
(3) the principles of autonomy and respect for the individual embraced in Faretta are only
applicable in the context of a defendant presumed innocent at trial. Id. The autonomy interest
is specifically diminished because appellants, already found guilty at trial, have had their
rights subjugated to the state’s interest in “fair and efficient administration of justice.” Id. at
163.
147. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008). In making this determination,
the Court looked to its own precedent on competency, which requires only that defendants be
able to consult with counsel, and to state court precedent on self-representation, which
requires that defendants have counsel when afflicted with a “mental derangement that would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his own defense.” Id. at 175 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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was the same as the competence needed to stand trial in the first
place.148
In an area even more ambiguous than mental incompetency,
courts have allowed the denial of the right to self-representation
when defendants abuse the right in order to create disruptions and
obstruct their criminal proceedings. This exception stems from
Faretta itself, which provided that “the trial judge may terminate
self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in
serious and obstructionist misconduct” and that “[t]he right of selfrepresentation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”149 Thus, courts tolerate the deprivation of the right to selfrepresentation when defendants use the right as “a tactic for delay,
for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of
the trial process.”150 The Supreme Court premised this holding on
its precedent involving another of the Sixth Amendment’s implied
rights—the right to be present for the entirety of one’s criminal
trial, which is itself a derivation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him or her.151 In that context, the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by
removing a defendant for “flagrant disregard in the courtroom of
elementary standards of proper conduct” because “[i]t is essential to
the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and
decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.”152
Faretta extended this reasoning to the deprivation of the right of
self-representation, but it did not suggest that all defendants who
lose the right to represent themselves also lose the right to be
148. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-98 (1993); United States v. Frazier-El,
204 F.3d 553, 559-60 (4th Cir. 2000) (construing Godinez as a binding pronouncement that
“the standard of competence for waiving counsel is identical to the standard of competence for
standing trial”).
149. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 343 (1970)); see also, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555, 558-59 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 2007); Decker, supra note 101, at 555-60.
150. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560 (citations omitted).
151. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (holding that courts
may physically restrain contumacious defendants, hold them in contempt, or remove them
from the courtroom)).
152. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see, e.g., Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 9;
see also Allen, 397 U.S. at 346-47 (“[O]ur courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be
treated disrespectfully with impunity.... [Courts] cannot and must not be infected with the
sort of scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded before the [trial court] in this case.”).
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present in the courtroom, implying an even higher standard of
behavior for pro se defendants who wish to continue representing
themselves.
This behavioral exception can have strict consequences for f lesh
and blood defendants. For example, after the Mitchell defendants
were removed from the courtroom for their disruptive behavior on
two occasions, Judge Davis warned:
If the defendants continue on the course they have now chosen,
of continued disruptive behavior in the courtroom (which will
require their removal from the courtroom during pre-trial and
trial proceedings) and of continued attacks on their lawyers and
refusals to cooperate with counsel, the possibility [that they will
be found guilty and sentenced to death] will grow increasingly
more likely.153

Recognizing similarly grave circumstances, courts have developed
supplementary alternatives to self-representation, including the
appointment of “standby counsel.”154
D. Alternatives
As the Supreme Court has held, in its experience, “a pro se
defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a
defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.”155
Accordingly, the Court has allowed even pro se defendants to receive
some assistance from counsel, although defining the scope of such
assistance has taken time. The primary means of involving attorneys in pro se cases is to appoint “standby counsel,” an idea
recognized in Faretta.156 The Court later explained that standby
counsel “relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic
rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming
153. United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606-07 n.6 (D. Md. 2005).
154. See Farretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
155. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (quoting Decker, supra
note 101, at 598). But see Hashimoto, supra note 101, at 446-54.
156. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“[A] State may—even over objection by the
accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help,
and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s
self-representation is necessary.”).
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routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant’s achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.”157 This assistance is
important because the defendant does not have a right to such help
from the judge.158
The Court has held, however, that standby counsel can overstep
their prescribed role, frustrating a defendant’s right to self-representation, especially in the event of unsolicited help or participation
in trial.159 In such a case, whether a defendant’s Faretta rights have
been violated is a question “whether the defendant had a fair chance
to present his case in his own way.”160 To help answer this question,
the Court has provided two standards against which a standby
counsel arrangement can be evaluated: first, “the pro se defendant
is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to
present to the jury,” and second, “participation by standby counsel
without the defendant’s consent should not be allowed to destroy
the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.”161
This means that the defendant must at least be able to speak to the
judge and jury, and the court must resolve disputes between the
defendant and standby counsel in favor of the defendant “whenever
the matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of
counsel.”162
These limitations combine to make standby counsel impractical
for f lesh and blood defendants. First, if the defendant intends to
present only a f lesh and blood defense, counsel will have little role.
At most, counsel could continue to try to dissuade the defendant
from his or her chosen course. Second, if counsel did choose to
participate and offered legitimate arguments in defiance of his or
her client’s wishes, such participation would likely exceed the
bounds of standby counsel’s role and create an impermissible
157. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984).
158. Id. at 183-84 (“A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal
instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does the Constitution require
judges to take over chores for a pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by
trained counsel as a matter of course.”).
159. See id. at 177.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis omitted) (“[T]he message conveyed by the defense may depend
as much on the messenger as on the message itself.... [T]he right to appear pro se can lose
much of its importance if only the lawyers in the courtroom know that the right is being
exercised.” (emphasis omitted)).
162. Id. at 179.
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perception in the minds of the jury that the defendant was not
actually representing him- or herself. This was the observation of
counsel for one of Willie Mitchell’s codefendants: “I don’t think
standby counsel could really function in the context of the case if the
defendants persist in their [pro se, f lesh and blood defense] motions.”163
The Supreme Court referred to an attorney’s participation beyond
the allowable role of standby counsel as “hybrid representation,”
which the Court deemed permissible only when both the defendant
and the court approve the arrangement.164 Holding that “[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right to choreograph special
appearances by counsel,” the Court found that when an enhanced
role for counsel is agreed upon, defendants may not complain that
their right to self-representation has been curtailed, unless they
speak up expressly to alter the previously approved arrangement
with counsel.165 Due to the difficulties of maintaining a clear boundary for the role of hybrid counsel, courts may find it easier to reject
proposals for such representation—an alternative that is well
within the court’s discretion because pro se defendants will have
already clearly and unequivocally waived their right to counsel.166
III. EXCEPTING THE FLESH AND BLOOD DEFENSE FROM THE RIGHT
TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
Pursuant to the federal statutory right to self-representation and
the fundamental constitutional right to self-representation recognized in Faretta and the cases interpreting it, f lesh and blood
defendants may exercise their rights to fire their attorneys and
present their wildly misinformed “defense” to the court pro se.167
Like Willie Mitchell, these defendants have likely heard about the
163. Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 26.
164. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 (“Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit ‘hybrid’
representation of the type [respondent] was actually allowed. But if a defendant is given the
opportunity and elects to have counsel appear before the court or jury, his complaints
concerning counsel’s subsequent unsolicited participation lose much of their force.”); see
United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1100-01 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1997).
165. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.
166. See Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1101 (“[T]he Constitution does not require a continuum of
representational rights.”).
167. See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
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defense in pre-trial detention from other inmates. And like Mr.
Mitchell, the defense will not get them very far. Mr. Mitchell, however, ultimately stood trial with counsel, in spite of his protestations.168 Like other f lesh and blood defendants,169 the Mitchell
defendants did not unequivocally waive their right to counsel—in
fact, they demanded counsel, as long as their would-be attorneys
had not sworn any oaths to support the United States,170 which the
Mitchell defendants perceived as their adversary.
Mitchell demonstrated one of a few ways that courts can ensure
f lesh and blood defendants get a fair trial—a trial in which they are
represented by counsel. After all, the f lesh and blood defense will
always lose—it is legally frivolous and indeed “not a legal argument
at all.”171 Allowing a defendant to go forward pro se in order to
advance the f lesh and blood defense is endorsing that defendant’s
eventual conviction and strict sentencing, perhaps even subjecting
the defendant to additional charges for obstructing earlier proceedings.172 Accordingly, courts facing intractable f lesh and blood defendants, like the Mitchell court, should except the f lesh and blood
defense from the right to self-representation.173 Although this right
168. See United States v. Mitchell, Nos. 09-4215, 09-4357, 09-4359, 09-4361, 2011 WL
2356887, at *1-2 (4th Cir. June 15, 2011) (referring to Mitchell’s counsel).
169. See supra Part I.B.2.
170. Mitchell March 2, 2006 Order, supra note 132, at 26.
171. Snyder, supra note 12, at 1266.
172. See, e.g., Mitchell, 2011 WL 2356887, at *3 (“[D]uring pretrial hearings, the four
defendants repeatedly engaged in disruptive behavior through coordinated and identical
demonstrations. The defendants gave identical speeches rejecting the jurisdiction of the
district court over them as live ‘flesh and blood’ men and denouncing the Government, the
district court, and their attorneys.... In its fourth superseding indictment, the Government
alleged that the racketeering conspiracy continued through the trial ... through disruption of
court proceedings. In order to prove this charge, the Government introduced the above
evidence of the defendants’ coordinated behavior.... [E]ven assuming the district court abused
its discretion in admitting this evidence, any error was harmless.” (citation, alteration, and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Carey, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that the
identical activity of the defendants in court added evidence to the conspiracy charge and
caused the introduction of new charges).
173. The court’s last word on counsel for the Mitchell defendants cited Fourth Circuit
precedent regarding motions to withdraw as counsel, which, pursuant to their clients’
instructions, the Mitchell defendants’ counsel had filed. See, e.g., Mitchell March 2, 2006
Order, supra note 132, at 25-27. Regarding one of the Mitchell defendants, the court held:
[I]t is clear that Gardner’s “problems” with his attorneys have nothing to do with
their preparation or their performance in this case. Rather, Gardner has told the
court that he wants to discharge them because they took an oath when they
were admitted to the Bar to uphold the Constitution, and because they would
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is grounded in “that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law,”174 a respect for the individual defendant must also
compel courts to recognize when a defendant is committing “suicide
by court”175 and to prevent this self-destructive behavior. Although
trial courts are instructed to preserve the right to self-representation “even if the court believes that the defendant will benefit from
the advice of counsel,”176 there are legitimate exceptions to the right,
which courts should carefully employ to forestall f lesh and blood
defendants from taking their chosen path.
Although adherents to f lesh and blood theories are entitled to
present their own defense, their entitlement is not limitless. First,
f lesh and blood defendants must meet the aforementioned requirements of self-representation.177 Listed in reverse order, a defendant’s request to proceed pro se must be timely.178 If a defendant
seeks to waive his or her right to counsel in order to present a f lesh
and blood defense after “meaningful trial proceedings have commenced,”179 the trial court has discretion to deny the waiver as
untimely,180 effectively keeping the f lesh and blood defense out of
the trial.
Second, if the request is timely, it must still be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.181 In the federal courts, standard operating
procedure dictates that this requirement be evaluated through the
use of a Faretta colloquy.182 Because f lesh and blood defendants may
not sign a certain “contract” he sent them. These assertions by Gardner are
frivolous in the extreme. I will not allow these antics to sabotage these
proceedings or to denigrate from the dignity the court intends to ensure they
embrace. Even though counsel are reasonably concerned with the need to comply
with the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and even though they
certainly have a difficult task in working with their obstreperous client, I find
that it is in the best interest of justice (and Gardner) that they continue their
representation of Gardner. The Motion for Leave to Withdraw shall be denied.
Id. at 26-27.
174. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Mitchell Dec. 8, 2005 Transcript, supra note 11, at 68.
176. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997).
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. See supra Part II.B.3.
179. United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
180. See supra text accompanying note 145.
181. See supra Part II.B.2.
182. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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refuse to cooperate with the court, or take any other action that
could be construed as recognizing the court’s jurisdiction,183 it is
unlikely that such a defendant could complete the colloquy, as was
the case in Mitchell.184 When unable to ascertain the knowingness,
intelligence, or voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver of counsel,
the trial court is within its power to deny the waiver and proceed
with counsel, as opposed to interpreting a defendant’s obstruction
as a waiver.
Finally, making a clear and unequivocal waiver will likely be
difficult for f lesh and blood defendants who, like the Mitchell defendants, may object to counsel only on the grounds that their
attorneys are sworn members of the Bar.185 Requests for different
counsel, which clients of court-appointed attorneys are not entitled
to make,186 are neither a clear nor an unequivocal waiver of the
right to counsel; rather they are an assertion of that right. Confronted with such a defendant, trial courts may keep the f lesh and
blood defense out of the courtroom by writing off all of the defendants’ protestations as frivolous. Short of a clear and unequivocal
waiver of counsel, they have no legal significance.
It may be the case that a f lesh and blood defendant is able to
make a clear, unequivocal, knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and
timely request to represent him- or herself. This event is unlikely
because cooperating with the court is anathema to f lesh and blood
defendants. But a court that interprets a defendant’s protestations
as a demonstration of the requirements of proceeding pro se may
find itself with a defendant who has effectively waived counsel. In
such a case, exceptions to the right to self-representation remain
that may allow the court to terminate the defendant’s pro se status
and reassign counsel.
The first, and simplest, means of ending self-representation is to
establish that a defendant has engaged in “serious and obstructionist misconduct.”187 This exception is easy to assert in cases such as
Mitchell and others in which contumacious defendants filibuster the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
See supra Part II.B.1; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); see supra Part II.C.
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court or flood the docket with irrelevant pro se filings.188 In such
cases, defendants use the right as a tactic for delay, disruption, and
manipulation.189 Judges are free to impose counsel on such defendants in order to avoid, as the Supreme Court put it, “degrad[ing]
our country and our judicial system[,] ... permit[ting] our courts to
be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly progress
thwarted and obstructed by defendants.”190 When f lesh and blood
defendants take a different tack, simply refusing to participate in
the proceedings, the trial court may still interpret their actions—or
inaction—as “obstructionist,” especially when the only other choice
is to allow the defendant to sit silently before the jury while the
government puts on a one-sided show trial.191
As an alternative, a court may utilize the increased competency
standard for self-representation to end a f lesh and blood defense. If
evidence can demonstrate that the defendant, although competent
to stand trial, is not competent to represent him- or herself, counsel
may be imposed on the defendant.192 This approach, however,
requires an evaluation of “mental capacities,”193 so that a court
cannot disqualify a defendant from self-representation when
adherence to the f lesh and blood defense is his or her only mental
defect.
Overall, a court confronted with a f lesh and blood defendant can
employ multiple mechanisms to avoid the unfortunate result of a
trial with a defenseless defendant. Courts that allow a f lesh and
blood defendant to stand trial and be sentenced without the
assistance of counsel are operating within the bounds of the
Constitution, especially in light of the defendant’s Faretta right to
self-representation. This outcome, however, is not what justice demands. With the requirements and exceptions to the Faretta right
188. See supra Part I.B.2.
189. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000).
190. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).
191. Cf. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560 (“The right [to self-representation] does not exist,
however, to be used ... for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process. A
trial court must be permitted to distinguish between a manipulative effort to present
particular arguments and a sincere desire to dispense with the benefits of counsel.” (citations
omitted)). The Frazier-El dissent, however, attacked this dictum as creating a “‘fourth’
requirement” of “‘sincerity,’ or ‘legitimacy.’” See id. at 566-69 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
192. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008).
193. Id.
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come opportunities to protect f lesh and blood defendants from their
inevitable railroading at trial. Allowing f lesh and blood defendants
to stand on only their “[b]izarre and misguided contentions”194
serves neither the individual defendants nor society. Although there
is intrinsic value in respecting a defendant’s right to self-representation, f lesh and blood defendants hardly represent themselves; they
effectively waive their right to present any defense at all. Compared
to that inevitable outcome, greater value exists in abridging f lesh
and blood defendants’ rights in order to save them from themselves.
As Judge Davis wrote in Mitchell:
Defendants are urged ... in the strongest possible terms, to desist
from their disruptive behavior and resume cooperation with
their counsel, who want desperately to save their lives....
It would be especially tragic if, in the end, one or more of these
young men were to receive a death sentence, in part, because he
acted willfully to thwart the very efforts of his lawyers to obtain
a not guilty verdict and/or to save his life even if he is convicted.... Surely, no matter what they may feel about this case,
their own families and loved ones cannot possibly desire such a
result.195

CONCLUSION
Since Faretta, courts have recognized a fundamental right to selfrepresentation, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Courts do not
deprive criminal defendants of this right solely because such defendants are making an unwise choice, or no one would ever be allowed
to represent him- or herself. However, courts do have some exceptions at their disposal, and denying a defendant’s request to represent him- or herself is commonplace. Because the “f lesh and
blood” defense will always fail, public policy and the interests of
194. United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (D. Md. 2005).
195. Id. at 606 & n.6. The government eventually withdrew its notices of intent to seek the
death penalty in Mitchell, ostensibly because so much time had elapsed in pre-trial
proceedings that the evidence at trial might no longer have amounted to a death penalty case.
See Carey, supra note 3, at 31. Whether this is a “success” for the flesh and blood defense is
a question that can be answered by only pre-trial detainees who will hear the story as part
of the flesh and blood lore. See id. Three of the four Mitchell defendants were sentenced to life
in prison, and one was sentenced to four hundred months. See Mitchell Appellants Brief,
supra note 133, at 7-8.
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justice dictate that it should be kept out of the courts, and defendants should not be able to fire their attorneys to pursue it.
Refusing to allow f lesh and blood defendants to proceed pro se
will serve the interests of justice by reaching more consistent results
between defendants charged with similar crimes, fulfilling defendants’ right to counsel when they seek to waive it for the sole
purpose of presenting a frivolous “defense,” and increasing judicial
economy. Courts should find that the defense is per se obstructionist
and disruptive in order to prevent it from being raised. Accordingly,
courts should keep appointed counsel in the case, unless and until
the defendant can articulate another reason he or she wants to
represent him- or herself. Even then, courts should take advantage
of the ability to force “standby counsel” on defendants.
On the “thin line” between the right to counsel and the right not
to have counsel, courts should err on the side of providing counsel,
especially when defendants want to proceed pro se solely to advance
losing f lesh and blood theories that no reasonable attorney would
contemplate. Metaphorically, forcing a lawyer on a criminal defendant may “imprison a man in his privileges and call it the
Constitution,”196 but allowing a f lesh and blood defendant to go to
trial without counsel will certainly end in his literal imprisonment
—surely not the result our system of justice demands.
James Erickson Evans*

196. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 815 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942)).
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APPENDIX
The Federal Judicial Center suggests that federal judges ask a
defendant the following questions if he or she expresses a desire to
represent him- or herself:
1. Have you ever studied law?
2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action?
3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes:
[state the crimes with which the defendant is charged]?
4. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime
charged in Count I, the court must impose an assessment of
$100 and could sentence you to as many as ___ years in prison,
impose a term of supervised release that follows imprisonment,
fine you as much as $____, and direct you to pay restitution?
[Ask the defendant a similar question for each crime charged
in the indictment or information.]
5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than
one of these crimes, this court can order that the sentences be
served consecutively, that is, one after another?
6. Do you understand that there are advisory Sentencing
Guidelines that may have an effect on your sentence if you are
found guilty?
7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on
your own? I cannot tell you or even advise you how you should
try your case.
8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?
9. Do you understand that the rules of evidence govern what
evidence may or may not be introduced at trial, that in representing yourself, you must abide by those very technical rules,
and that they will not be relaxed for your benefit?
10. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure?
11. Do you understand that those rules govern the way a
criminal action is tried in federal court, that you are bound by
those rules, and that they will not be relaxed for your benefit?
[Then say to the defendant something to this effect:]
12. I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer
would defend you far better than you could defend yourself. I
think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are
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not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court
procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I
strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.
13. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are
found guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you still desire to represent yourself and to give
up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
14. Is your decision entirely voluntary?
[If the answers to the two preceding questions are yes, say
something to the following effect:]
15. I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived the right to counsel. I will therefore permit the defendant to represent himself [or herself].197

197. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 136, at 6-7 (margin notes omitted).

